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Introduction
In the modern longer life course, adults spend con-
siderable time in households without young children
as a result of delays in family formation and parent-
hood as well as death. Indeed, in the “spring” of the
modern life course (i.e., early adulthood), young
adults first experiment with relationships and jobs be-
fore they take on responsibility for raising children
during the “summer:” the family season of life when
adults raise minors.After their children have grown
up, adults typically spend considerable time in good
health in the “fall”season of their life course (i.e.,the
active senior phase) before they enter “winter”: the
last phase of life in which people suffer from serious
health problems.The modern life course is most ap-
parent in Northern Europe.In this region,many peo-
ple in the age brackets between 20 and 30 and above
55 live as singles or as couples without children. In
Southern Europe, in contrast, the extended family is
still very much present in these age groups.
During the summer season in the modern life course,
the costs of living are high while time is scarce,as par-
ents invest not only in their children but also in their
careers.During this so-called “rush-hour of life”,peo-
ple may experience “combination stress”.Compared
to other European household types,families with co-
residing children are least satisfied with living condi-
tions,including their work (or main activity),income,
housing, and leisure time (Avramov 2002).This con-
tribution explores institutional failures that damage
human capital accumulation and hamper flexibility
and adaptability over the life cycle.These institution-
al failures lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of
time and other resources over the life course, there-
by contributing to more pressure on the summer sea-
son of the life course.
Incentives to retire early 
Various schemes encouraging early retirement have
resulted in workplace cultures that fail to maintain hu-
man capital.These schemes have thus set in motion a
vicious circle:workers retire early because their skills
are obsolete, while human capital is not maintained
because people can retire early. The result is a short
working-time horizon and a low utilization rate of hu-
man capital.Indeed,cross-country data show a strong-
ly positive correlation between spending on training
and the effective retirement age (OECD 2006).
The waste of human capital as a result of early re-
tirement originates in the erroneous belief that early
retirement reduces unemployment because the
amount of work is fixed:the so-called “lump-of-labor
fallacy”. In fact, early retirement has contributed to
unemployment by putting a heavy financial burden
on companies and families with young children.
Indeed, countries with the lowest participation rates
(and thus labor supply) feature the highest unem-
ployment rates (OECD 2006).
Moreover, early retirement has nurtured working
place cultures in which careers must be made during
the time when people bear family responsibilities for
young children, thereby creating time pressures in
the family season of life in the age range between
30 and 45. By thus preventing men from taking on
more household duties and caring for children,these
cultures have fostered gender inequalities in em-
ployment and earnings patterns. Indeed, fathers of-
ten cite workplace cultures as the key reason why
they are not more involved with their families
(European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions 2003).This explains
why the European countries with the lowest effective
retirement age also feature the lowest female partic-
ipation and fertility rates.In this connection,early re-
tirement has also worsened liquidity constraints in
early adulthood by transferring resources away from
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Lack of wage flexibility for older workers 
An important factor explaining the low effective re-
tirement age in Europe is the lack of wage flexibility
for elderly workers,which reduces labor demand and
thus results in a weak labor-market position for these
workers.Since many social benefits (provided by un-
employment and disability insurance, for example)
are directly linked to previously earned wages
through fixed replacement rates,elderly workers who
have experienced a decline in their earning potential
are hard pressed to find a job that is acceptable to
them, and therefore reduce their search intensities.
Wage rigidity explains the increase in structural,long-
term inactivity in Europe following adverse macro-
economic shocks and in the face of more idiosyncratic
shocks to the earning potential of individual workers
due to more creative destruction.Whereas European
displaced workers experience smaller income losses
than their American colleagues, they face smaller
reemployment probabilities,resulting in further rapid
depreciation of their human capital (Ljungvist and
Sargent 1998).
Another factor weakening the demand for older
workers is the implicit labor contract according to
which workers are underpaid when young and over-
paid later on. This contract can encourage young
workers to invest in firm-specific human capital and
promote workers’ effort and cooperation. At the
same time, however, it ties older workers with gold-
en chains to their employer. Moreover, it makes old-
er workers dependent on the survival of the firm they
work for and discourages entrepreneurship. These
workers thus experience a lack of security associated
with “fear of falling”in a dynamic economy in which
creative destruction causes companies to exhibit
shorter lifespans.Indeed,the implicit contract creates
a gap between the insiders who are lucky enough to
work for a surviving firm and the outsiders whose
firms have not survived.
Another drawback of the implicit contract is that it
requires a mandatory retirement age at which work-
ers are laid off.Hence,the speed and extent of phased
retirement cannot act as a buffer for absorbing ag-
gregate financial market and aggregate longevity
risks. In an actuarially neutral pension system, work-
ing one year longer (and thus receiving annuities one
year later) tends to raise their pension by about eight
percent.The speed and timing of retirement is thus a
powerful instrument for absorbing risks.
Employment protection
Social insurance systems in various European coun-
tries protect breadwinners against income shocks
through employment protection legislation and social
insurance linked to previous earnings.These systems
shielded families against poverty at a time when the
earning potential of women was low and men could
look forward to a continuously increasing wage pro-
file in a single-track, full-time career. In modern
economies that rely on creative destruction and fea-
ture a large potential labor supply of female skilled
workers who aim for careers in paid work, these sys-
tems protecting insiders are increasingly costly in
terms of wasting human capital of outsiders,tying old-
er incumbents to the fortunes of their employer and
discouraging these insiders from moving into new jobs
that better fit their life season.Paradoxically,workers
feel more secure in those European countries in which
employment protection is lowest. One reason is that
employment protection discourages not only firing
but also hiring, thereby reducing the turnover in the
labor market, and thus the jobs that are opening up
for new entrants to the labor market, and for those
who want to get out of their current jobs.Rather than
the difficulty of being laid off from the current job,the
ease with which a worker can find a new job is be-
coming increasingly important in determining the sen-
timent of security in a transitional labor market.
In addition to preserving the status quo when inno-
vation requires new work practices,employment pro-
tection discriminates against outsiders by slowing
down turnover in the labor market.The lower prob-
ability of finding a good job in a dual labor market
depresses the labor supply of secondary workers and
raises the opportunity costs of bearing children for
young, highly educated women. In countries with
strict employment legislation in which workers hold
permanent highly protected jobs, women face both
higher unemployment risk and the prospect of lower
future wage growth (through foregone experience
and delayed wage growth) if they temporarily (or on
a part-time basis) exit the labor market during the
childbearing years. Indeed, worsened future career
prospects, rather than foregone earnings during the
relatively short period spent with the baby, account
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for the bulk of the opportunity costs (in terms of low-
er lifetime income) of becoming a mother (or of shar-
ing household work and caring for a child as a father).
Thus,whereas the literature has traditionally focused
on maternity benefits and childcare as the key to-
wards reconciling work and family life,an inclusive la-
bor market is at least as important because in such la-
bor markets young workers do not have to engage in
costly rent seeking to acquire highly protected jobs
when they build a family.
On the basis of a panel of OECD countries for the
last 35 years,Adsera (2004) shows that countries with
labor market institutions facilitating women’s exit
and entry in the labor market combine high fertility
rates with high female labor supply.This third factor
of rigid labor markets protecting insiders at the ex-
pense of younger workers explains why the cross-
country correlation between fertility and female la-
bor-force participation, which has traditionally been
negative (conforming to the theoretical predictions),
became positive in the mid-1980s. In particular, fer-
tility dropped in southern European countries (with
traditionally low female participation rates) when
structural unemployment rose.
By discouraging employment of young adults and the
elderly, employment protection and wage compression
contribute to the compression of the working life.
Moreover, young adults stay in full-time education
longer than would be optimal.As a direct consequence,
social adulthood and the responsibility for supporting
oneself is increasingly postponed beyond the age of bi-
ological maturation.Bertola,Blau and Kahn (2002) find
that employment protection and wage compression
price women as well as young and elderly men out of
employment and into other states (the informal econo-
my, home making, education and retirement). OECD
(2006) shows a significant negative relationship be-
tween employment protection and the employment rate
of the population aged 50–64 across OECD countries.
Housing market: insiders versus outsiders
Young households often face difficulties entering not
only the labor market but also the housing market.To
illustrate, rent control protecting incumbent renters
typically reduces the rental housing supply for new
entrants and results in the rationing of rental proper-
ties.As a direct consequence,workers find it difficult
to move around. This hurts their job prospects and,
more generally, the flexibility of the labor market.
Tax incentives that are not targeted at new entrants
may drive up house prices. High house prices reallo-
cate resources from young households who have not
entered the housing market towards older incum-
bents. Imperfect capital markets that prevent young
households with insecure jobs from taking out mort-
gages add to the strain experienced by youngsters.
The difficulty of entering the labor and housing mar-
kets discourages young people from starting a fami-
ly. This lengthens the period of social adolescence,
thereby postponing the establishment of a durable re-
lationship and parenthood.
Internal flexibility of firms 
Workplace practices and cultures in many countries
are still oriented towards the full-time male bread-
winner who can devote all of his time and energy to
his career.Senior male management and unions (of-
ten dominated by older male workers) sometimes
lack leadership in introducing family-friendly work-
place measures. These measures include flexible
leave policies (parental leave, emergency leave to
care for sick elderly relatives or children); flexible
working hours (e.g., school-holiday adjusted work-
ing hours;part-time work;flexi-time);flexible work-
ing arrangements (like tele-working); support with
childcare and eldercare; and provision of training
during or after leave so that the allocation of work
over the life cycle is better adjusted to the biolo-
gical clock of women. Even if some of these facili-
ties are present, workers sometimes fail to take ad-
vantage of them because they fear that doing so
would harm their careers (Groot and Breedveld
2004).Indeed,employers may perceive women who
take time off for childbirth as less committed to their
career than male breadwinners, and are therefore
less likely to invest in female career opportunities.
This produces a vicious circle, as many women do
not pursue a career in view of a limited likelihood
of advancement.
Empirical evidence suggests that the career effects of
taking parental leave differ substantially across coun-
tries,reflecting different workplace cultures.To illus-
trate, Kunze (2003) finds that taking parental leave
substantially reduces future wage growth in
Germany. In Sweden, in contrast, women do not ex-
perience much smaller wage growth after taking
parental leave (Albrecht et al. 1999). Apparently,
since taking parental leave is so common in Sweden,
it does not signal anything about career commitment.High wage floors
Welfare payments and minimum wages in many coun-
tries are based on a breadwinner having to care for a
dependent adult and young children.The need to pro-
vide an income for two adults results in high mini-
mum-wage floors and compresses the wage scale.
Moreover, the limited wage flexibility at the bottom
of the labor market puts the unskilled out of work,re-
sulting in social exclusion and further loss of skills and
morale. Indeed, high minimum wages act as a tax on
employers who employ low-skilled labor.The absence
of a low-wage sector prevents families (and also the
elderly) from contracting-out household services
(cleaning and housekeeping,small repairs around the
house, child minding, old-age care). Women thus re-
duce their labor supply as households face more dif-
ficulties in reconciling work and family life.
The idea that a minimum wage should be sufficient
to provide for a dependent adult and young children
is increasingly inappropriate for two reasons.First of
all, the potential earnings of the secondary earner
have increased because of the stronger labor-market
position of women.Second,in the modern longer life
course,adults spend considerable time in households
without young children. In the spring and fall of the
modern life course,adults thus do not have to care for
young children and therefore can make do with low-
er incomes and social protection.In any case,a high-
er minimum-wage floor raises the human capital re-
quirements of those entering the labor force.If agents
do not have sufficient capabilities to earn the mini-
mum wage, they risk ending up in welfare schemes.
Equity versus efficiency 
Redistribution from rich to poor and social insurance
against income losses are basic functions of the wel-
fare state.In modern welfare states,however,a large
part of the taxes levied to finance social transfers
merely redistributes resources from one stage in an
individual’s life cycle to another. Pettersson and
Pettersson (2003) found that only 18 percent of the
taxes levied to finance social insurance transfers and
social services in Sweden can be categorized as inter-
personal redistribution. For Ireland and Italy,
O’Donoghue (2001) estimated a degree of interper-
sonal redistribution of 45 percent and 24 percent,re-
spectively. Sørensen et al. (2006) found that the de-
gree of interpersonal redistribution in Denmark
amounts to 26 percent across all taxpayers.
These studies show that a considerable part of the tax
bill does not redistribute lifetime income from the
lifetime rich to the lifetime poor but is essentially in-
come that the taxpayer transfers to himself over his
own life course.In the absence of an actuarial link be-
tween (social security) taxes paid and social transfers
received, taxes and transfers inevitably distort labor
supply. Moreover, transfer programs often create
moral hazard, as taxpayers have no incentive to re-
duce their reliance on transfers.
Conclusions 
This article has explored the institutional failures
that damage human capital accumulation and ham-
per flexibility and adaptability over the life cycle.
Together with aging, these institutional failures
threaten the intergenerational contract according to
which each generation invests in the human capital
of the next and is taken care of at the end of its life
by the generations in which it has invested.
Traditional social policies, such as compressed wage
scales and job protection,are becoming increasingly
counterproductive in generating security. This calls
for institutional innovation in developing new proac-
tive approaches to social protection over the life cy-
cle. Among other things, passive benefits compen-
sating the loss of human capital should be trans-
formed into preventive,proactive social policies that
build and maintain human capital. As workers in-
creasingly combine their work with other activities
(caring, resting and learning), new social-protection
institutions should facilitate various transitions and
changing combinations of activities during the life
course. Flexibility in wages and work practices thus
becomes more important. A more adaptable labor
force provides the legitimacy for competitive open
markets and the creative destruction associated with
rapid innovation and growth. Moreover, substantial
human capital contributes to a high level of labor-
force participation, which provides a strong eco-
nomic basis for ensuring solidarity with the vulnera-
ble elderly, children and disadvantaged adults of
working age.
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